Tuesday, October 18, 2011

Problems with Libertarian Freedom

Libertarian freedom is the notion, as articulated by Jerry Walls in Philosophia Christi, ("Why No Christian Should Be a Compatibalist") that in any choice 1, I can reasonably do either A or B. There are no constraints or controls with respect to my choices. It should be noted that by "constraints or controls" libertarians also mean causal factors such as coercion by God or by desires beyond the control of my conscious will. It simply means that for any act, it is possible that I can do the opposite. Now this sounds like will neutrality, and surely that is what it amounts to practically. The will is wholly spontaneous. It is even questionable what "generates" choices. They may be wholly self-generating. Alvin Plantinga has suggested as much, even likening human choices to spontaneous emissions of sub-atomic particles in radioactive decay. Choices just appear to emanate from individuals and perhaps without any causal interference. For if antecedent causal conditions produce choices, then such choices are determined, at least to some extent, but then they cannot be truly libertarian. The will must operate spontaneously with respect to choices or else the option is not a "live option."

Here are a few of my problems with the notion of libertarian freedom (and note that I am something of a novice with the libertarian position, so think of this as a way of working through the issues):

1. Why can God not actualize a world in which all free creatures (in the libertarian sense) choose to be saved? (Note here that the great concern of libertarians is the perceived arbitrary nature of the number of saved souls in the compatibalist/Calvinist scheme.)

We are told that perhaps this is not an available option for God among the possible worlds, but then again perhaps it is an available option and God has merely chosen to actualize this world instead. Surely the situation can be better in this world. Surely greater appeals to the libertarian will can be made, since libertarian will means that sin is not debilitating with respect to choices of extreme moral import such as salvation. Perhaps God could have improved things in this world for those with libertarian freedom by doing some or all of the following...

a. God could be more active in solving the language problem, thus presenting greater opportunities to come to belief for language groups.
b. God could be active in a complex fashion, appealing to various cultures simultaneously.
c. More miracles could be done, appealing again to the libertarian wills of men. Atheists often tell us that if they could see greater evidence of miracles, then they would believe. Why not take them at their word if their freedom is libertarian?
d. Those who require more evidence before they will submit their free will could receive that evidence.
e. God could kill all infants in the womb He knows "will not choose Him," thus instantly bringing them into heaven. In theory, the only people born would be those that freely come to belief.

It seems a frail objection to all of these points simply to say, "Well, God knows that among the possible worlds, this world with all of its unbelief is the best option." The point is that even in this world he could have done more to "inspire" belief without directly causing it.

Is it not at least possible that there exists a world in which God provides sufficient "circumstances" to lead all men to belief (or at least many more than presently do), but He nevertheless chooses not to instantiate such a world? One has to at least grant this as a possibility, in which case it is possible that God has chosen this world over one that would ensure that all (or at least more) would come to belief. But of course that leads the libertarian strait into the dilemma for which libertarianism is supposed to be the remedy--namely, that God has elected a world that condemns people (and perhaps a vast majority of them), and for no other reason than His mysterious intentions.

2. If libertarianism is true, then heaven makes no sense.

Why is this libertarian freedom, which is so unpredictable, even volatile, such that it is wholly stable in heaven?

Perhaps the libertarian would conclude that the only reason for this is that there are no longer any "external" enticements to sin. The will itself need not be healed, and neither do the affections or motives of the heart need to be healed. Why? Because remember that the will sits above the desires in pristine neutrality. While there are no causal factors anterior to willful engagements in the wrong, there must also be no causal factors anterior to willful engagements in the right. Thus, a man with only pure desires may make corrupt choices, and a man with consistently evil desires may make pure choices. A wholly righteous internal disposition in man is therefore not required to fund ongoing stable belief in heaven. So why is heaven so stable with respect to the willful choices of the people in a libertarian heaven? Heaven must be the one place in the universe that is so resplendently appealing that there is ample circumstantial reinforcement to inspire ongoing fidelity without manipulating the choices of people in heaven.

But this leads to a disturbing problem for the libertarian. If all that was required to "lead" or "inspire" the neutral will into ongoing faithfulness was a kind of aesthetic beauty that naturally appealed to that will, then why did not God provide so sublime a place for mankind initially? Again, to suggest that such a world is not among the possible worlds available for God to instantiate is silly since he will make such a world actual eventually. Thus the only thing that kept Adam and Even from ongoing faithfulness was that God did not deliver to their libertarian freedom the circumstances he will deliver to others in heaven later. But that means he must have had some purpose for the fall of man, which starts to sound rather Calvinistic.

Or consider this from another angle: Surely my libertarian freedom will not be removed in heaven. But then I am in the same position as Adam, in one sense. How can I be sure that the conditions of heaven will be such that I will always choose the good? Perhaps what we have said concerning the winsome conditions of heaven are merely speculative and that my libertarian will trumps any appeals and enticements from without no matter how glorious they are. Is it at least possible that for every choice 2 in heaven, I am truly free to do A or B. And if my will is not determined in any way, then it is perhaps inscrutable whether or not I will rebel in heaven. What power could constrain my will to choice A in heaven for all eternity and leave it free in the libertarian sense?

3. The doctrine of Hell makes no sense if libertarianism is true.

If for every person counterfactuals A and B face no determining interference, either from his or her nature or from God or from the environment, then surely hell poses no limits on libertarian freedom either. It is, in theory, within the power of a person in hell to live a sinless life. There is nothing preventing him from doing right in choice 1, then choice 2, then choice 3, and so on ad infinitum. Why? Because nothing interferes with libertarian freedom, even in hell.

And if it is mere external conditions that keep people from believing, even in hell, then why would God not merely eliminate these conditions, thus allowing them naturally to come to belief?

Perhaps the libertarian should be a universalist, for two reasons:

If Jesus dies for the sins of all men, then surely all men's sins are removed and God need not punish anyone in Hell. After all, Jesus has already been punished for the sins of all humanity.

And if therefore the only reason for hell is "libertarian consequentialism"--that is, people supposedly continue to choose to be there--then surely changing the circumstances of these unhappy people, or merely waiting for the right free responses, is the thing a loving God would do. But given an infinite time in hell, surely a libertarian free will is going to eventually make a right choice with respect to salvation at least.

And a last point that addresses both heaven and hell for a libertarian: How can God judge or reward someone for choices that are not even determined by the man's heart (motives)? If choices appear without any prior determining conditions, then they are wholly vacuous uncaused phenomena. People don't make choices; choices happen to people. The curious thing here is that libertarians assume that free choice is necessary to establish moral accountability. It looks to me as though the opposite is true. And if that is true, why would God need to punish such sins in hell or reward willful belief in heaven? All unhappy souls in hell need only plead that "their will made them do it."