Friday, April 19, 2013

General Theism is the Coward's Agnosticism

In this blog I want to pursue the inadequacy of general theism, sometimes referred to as deism. I should probably be honest about my motivations here. I have seen several former students migrate from faith in God to an ambiguous faith in some mystical power that at the very least started the universe but apparently now doesn't particularly care about it, or us. As Lewis once put it, "all the thrills of religion and none of the cost." Exactly.

It seems to me that there are at least four problems with this view:

1. Ambiguity:

This is where David Hume's argument against the teleological argument has some merit. Hume essentially argues that the only thing design in the universe gives us is "an intelligence remotely like our own." It tells us nothing about how competent this intelligence is. It tells us nothing about how good this intelligence is. It tells us nothing about how involved this deity is; for all we know it could be manipulating atoms or could be merely absent from things except as an initial "engineer."

Such a god is a mere postulate in an argument to solve some problems in science, such as the improbability problem. But surely postulating some vague notion of god is equal to postulating some vague notion of multiverses--that is, if all one desires to do is to increase probability for human existence. In short, the teleological argument doesn't constrain one to allegiance to the vague god precisely because the god is vague.

There are only two places to go with this insight: one, skepticism, which is where Hume went, and two, revealed theology, which is where most enlightened theists dread to go.

2. Plato's problem:

Apparently in general theism a gulf is fixed between the “ideal” and where we are. And our only way to cross the gulf is from our end, but different people have different views about what is “over there” and how to get there. We are lost in epistemological relativism. One is left with the unenviable position of confessing an objective reality without any objective means to reach it. 

This subjectivity shows itself primarily in ethics. Since this god, or force, or whatever it is, provides no concrete revelation, ethics collapses to mere speculation. God perhaps designed us, but we could in theory be broken and god is saying nothing about restoring this brokenness. Perhaps this brokenness disables us in some way, but we cannot know. 

Even if there were an objective ethics we could find, God presumably doesn’t care enough about us or the ethic he revealed to enforce it, or at least we have no good reason to think he would. What would it be like if there was a law, but no police, no courts, no prisons, no hell and no God. Of course no one would take the law seriously. 

Some deists might claim that God will enforce things ultimately, but how on earth can we know this without some revelatory system?

3. Math and Morality are of the same kind: 

One wonders if the general theist even can claim the moral argument for his own. He wants to suggest that there is an objective reality behind mathematics and morality. Perhaps even the atheist wants to make such a claim. There are interesting problems here: 

Math and morality are generally epistemologically grounded in an a priori "category," but surely they differ in quality. Math describes nature in concrete ways, such as the process of affixing abstract numbers to discreet phenomena in the universe. Morality, on the other hand, if objective, like mathematics, instructs mankind concerning our behaviors in the world. We are servants of morality; we are certainly not servants of something that is merely descriptive like 2 + 2 = 4. What I am pointing to here is the Euthyphro dilemma. If morality is objective, unchanging, present in all human minds and exercises dominion over human behavior, then surely that law is higher up and further back than human minds and must be obeyed. Such a conclusion, while not consistent with atheism, could be consistent with a theism that suggests God has built us with a moral design plan that includes things like love and compassion. But surely such a conception of God is not wholly removed from us. Such a God is clearly "touching" us through our very designed composition, which at the very least seems to complicate advocating for a "removed" deity. 

4. Theism is a cowards agnosticism:

Why not just admit what you are--namely, an agnostic? What is a person who believes in a vague notion of divinity but cannot say anything whatever about it? He knows only that it exists, for some reason, but has literally no other content to claim about it, at least no other content that he can be sure about. His intellectual speculations are layered upon his doubts are layered upon his questions are layered upon his mythological conjectures about aliens, and so on. He is always learning and never able to come to a knowledge of the truth because, after all, what on earth is the truth? He is evolved enough to know that unending questions are far more important than simple answers. His university education taught him that certainty is the only intellectual sin.

But of course, the man who asks all the good questions and provides no answers is an agnostic. Deep down he must know that if god is a hermit god and wants to be left alone, then perhaps we should oblige him. And off we shuffle to Vegas in the meantime (which oddly shows a great deal of confidence in materialism).

5. Theism retains the right to god-like arrogance:

No answers can be satisfying. No worldview can be true. No one can be sure of these philosophical matters. The theist can rest undisturbed in the throne of his skepticism of every positive idea proposed to him, and need never defend his own positive case, because he does not have one. Most theists are sophists, people who will argue any position with you because, for all they know, winning an intellectual chess match is the only validation they will find in this puzzling universe. 

These people really believe that if their minds are restless and unsatisfied, then clearly there can be no confident knowledge of the truth anywhere in the wide universe. They think they are placed upon this earth to criticize holy texts and cannot abide the notion that any text is sent into the world to criticize them. 

The curious thing about this vague god-behind-the-universe they affirm is that it never interrupts them when they are talking, especially when they are interrogating various representatives of the world's religions. As such they get to remain the real divinities of the world, so intimidating in their self-proclaimed ideological jurisdiction as to leave god subject to them and speechless. They fancy themselves modern Socrates', leading everyone away from the pride of knowledge to a semblance of the their own humble uncertainty. They would love nothing more than to leave the world full of questions. But deep down they know that the world cannot survive on questions, and would be served unworthily with them as gods.

In the end it seems to me that theism is far too cowardly to be respected and far too ambiguous to be taken seriously as a viable worldview. Actually, it is not a worldview, but the mood of the inconsistent, non-committal philosophical narcissist, the anti-worldview worldview. It is postmodernism hiding behind a degree rather than the more honest postmodernism that flourishes in the marijuana-baked frat house. I feel exactly the same way about it as I do about agnosticism. I'm desperate for people with the backbone to move out of the safe realm of questions and into ownership of a philosophy of life that must be defended. Let people be vulnerable enough to say something! Yes, people go through a process of learning, but they do so in order to commit to something!

The vague theist escapes ever having to defend anything. Perhaps the best way to put my objection to him is to say that he just bores me. I'd much rather have a quality theological fight with a Mormon than hear more of my theist friends pansy "concerns."

Is it possible that theism is a transitional phase into Christianity? Perhaps. But it is equally possible that theism is a transitional phase out of Christianity and into the coward's agnosticism!

Monday, April 15, 2013

Is This Really The Argument For Gay Marriage?

Here I want to summarize what I've been hearing concerning the gay marriage question, in the hopes that I can leave the subject for awhile. There are some loose ends to tie up because I hear many responses both to my arguments, and to the arguments of others, that are wholly inadequate.

1. We say, "It's not natural." They say, "But it can be seen in animals."

What on earth can the gay marriage advocate mean by this response? Do they mean that anything produced by nature is natural? Is a man who runs repeatedly into a wall until he dies living in accord with nature? Is a pedophile expressing natural sexuality?

Two things can be said here. One, when chimpanzees express homosexual behavior, surely it is reasonable to suggest that evolution cannot "see" such behavior, and in that sense it is not in the chimpanzees evolutionary interests to continue to behave in that way.

But secondly, even though animals may demonstrate homosexual behavior (although the burden of proof is on the side of the advocate of homosexuality to demonstrate that sodomy is practiced among other mammals) they also demonstrate a lot of other kinds of troubling behavior. Some animals eat their young. Many males abandon their young. Other males maintain harems. Should they do these things? Such a question is totally unanswerable, because we have no glimpse at the consciousness of animals. As far as we know, the law of the jungle is purely a matter of survival, and so I can't help but be puzzled by this appeal to animals as ethical models. Is it at least possible that natural design for human beings is fundamentally different than natural design for chimpanzees?

2. We say, "Gays cannot reproduce." They say, "But neither can infertile couples."

I've said a lot on this question, particularly in this blog post: http://monomaniacy.blogspot.com/2013/04/but-what-about-infertile-couples.html

But here is a brief summation: To compare infertile couples to gay couples is like comparing a paraplegic to a person who elects to use his legs as a pin cushion. One is an example of merely broken nature; the other an example of a choice to break nature.

3. We say, "It is best to have husband and wife raise a child." They say, "Gay couples do just as fine a job of parenting as heterosexuals."

Denis Prager has asked a question concerning adoption that I think is useful here: When it comes to placing a child in a home, is there any reason to prefer a husband and wife over two men or two women, all things being equal? Most of us instinctively approve of the idea that a man and a woman in the home are better than single parent homes, for example. Of course a single mother can raise a lovely child, but does that mean there is no ideal here? Is it optimal for society to have more single parent homes?

The gay marriage advocate must conclude that the gay couple and the heterosexual couple are both equally capable candidates to raise children, and there is nothing in the one that would cause us to prefer it over the other. I suppose one should merely flip a coin. In other words, children really don't need a man in the home. And it is equally acceptable to have no woman in the home either. It is a kind of hidden sexism. Children don't require intimate exposure to one sex in order to "turn out just fine."

4. We say, "There are real and even substantial differences between men and women." They say, "Anything a husband can give a wife can give, and anything a wife can give a husband can give. More than that, anything a father can give a mother can give, and anything a mother can give a father can give."

Douglas Wilson rather poetically articulates the Christian understanding of marriage at creation. God breaks things apart so that he can bring them back together in a higher unity. But this higher unity presupposes real difference. When husband and wife bring their fundamental differences together to form "one flesh," their love making is life producing. This real difference brought into unity multiplies the difference and thus presents an even deeper opportunity for unity--namely, the family.

The gay marriage camp seems to favor an egalitarian view of human sexuality, which would essentially say that maleness and femaleness are artificial human contrivances. We make up such concepts. We want to raise our children in a state of pristine neutrality, free to choose the sex with which they desire to identify. It diminishes the freedom of a child to merely assign gender identity because of something like genetalia, and it also diminishes his or her (its) freedom to assign religious, moral, nationalistic, party or personality strictures as well. Perhaps the child will desire to express both sexes, to be the first ever male president (or priest) who changes his sexuality and then changes it back again to lead the way in the new sexual freedom.

5. We say, "If society wants to reward a particular understanding of marriage, then so be it." They say, "Opponents of gay marriage are guilty of civil injustice and hate crimes."

Can the denial of marriage rights be equated to something like the denial of voting rights? Is it true that denying someone rewards is tantamount to a punishing them? There is a stunning degree of political hyperbole and political hypochondria in our day. In fact, I think I will soon seek legal counsel because so many people bully Christians. We live in a Christophobic culture! And surely I can find someone to sue for it.

The fact is that the state may want to take an interest in encouraging a certain understanding of normative sexual relations and marriage and family, since a great deal of stability in society is forged by stable families. Gays and straight alike think polygamy is not acceptable. Are we to think that fundamentalist Mormon's, for example, are living a life deprived of civil liberties currently? What gives us the right to deprive them of so essential a right?

6. We say, "Marriage is older than American civil law, and is more important and foundational than America." They say, "America can do whatever it wants with marriage."

Here we run into what I have called the "epistemological problem" of gay marriage. If we are not to define marriage the way it has been defined for all these millennia, then who will supply the definition, and on whose authority? Typically we are given the positive law/postmodernist/relativistic option. Society merely assigns meaning to the word. But of course if this is true, then it is perfectly fair for someone to ask why its definition cannot be something other than the group determines it should be. Why not polygamy? Why not incest? Why not no marriage at all (Huxley)? Why not father and adult son (as Jeffrey Lyons suggested)?

Note this is not a slippery slope fallacy. No thinking person is saying that such radical versions of marriage will occur. The point is that the same logic employed to argue for gay marriage can broadly be used to argue for the various iterations I've suggested.

7. We say, "Gay marriage is clearly condemned by the Bible." They say, "Not so fast."

Liberal theology abounds in our day. One of the common suggestions is that Paul nowhere condemns "homosexuality," but only "abusive" homosexuality.

For one thing, the interpretive method of many of these people is questionable, to say the least. They sort of begin with the assumption that if a text is old, then it must not be communicating a timeless truth that is in any way discernible from our present vantage point. They want to suggest that only pagan manifestations of homosexuality, such as in temple prostitution and pedophilia, are excluded in the Bible. Paul simply apparently didn't know anything about generic Christ loving homosexuality. But of course on that interpretive scheme, perhaps Paul didn't know anything about Christ loving adultery either. Perhaps he meant only to condemn patriarchal and abusive forms of adultery.

Perhaps the best piece I've seen that exposes the interpretive problems here is a satire by Peter Speckhard: http://firstthings.com/blogs/evangel/2009/12/temple-prostitution-a-modest-proposal/

8. We say, "You shouldn't arbitrarily redefine marriage." They say, "But it was redefined when they legalized interracial marriage."

The curious thing here is that interracial marriage had nothing to do with a redefinition of marriage. The prior racist conception had to do with the worthiness of one race engaging in marriage with another race. What we mean minimally by marriage is "one man and one women joined before God in committed lifelong monogamy." The problem with the ban on interracial marriage wasn't the man and woman part, but the human part. In other words, certain races were deemed less than fully human, and as such should not marry with those considered fully human. When interracial marriage bans were lifted, it wasn't an expansion of the definition of marriage, but an expansion of the definition of humanity! To say that lifting interracial marriage bans constituted a change in the definition of marriage is like saying that allowing blacks the vote was a change in the "one man, one vote" principle. The principle didn't change, but those considered "men" did change.

To use interracial marriage against opponents of gay marriage is a simple category mistake.