Lecture Series: Lecture 6: Rational Arguments for The Existence of God

And now to the rational arguments for the existence of God. At the outset of such an endeavor there are some who are offended. "God cannot be proved by human arguments," they say. "It is plain arrogance that makes men think they can capture God in an argument," etc.

Let me make it clear that I believe that God's existence, according to the argument of Scripture, is a rational necessity. It is abundantly clear that God exists, wholly apart from any biblical revelation (Rom 1). The atheist who denies God's existence or the pantheist who worships creature rather than creator have both violated what they know to be true--namely, that God exists and that He is not us! They are not "seekers" or "neutral reasoners" considering all sides of an argument. They deny what they know to be true! They are like the man standing on the train tracks with a train bearing down on him denying that trains exist or claiming that the train is only an illusion.

It occurs to me that the various arguments for God's existence are merely an extension of the logic of Romans 1. "What may be known about God is obvious, having been clearly seen by what has been made." So let's look at each argument in turn:

1. The Cosmological Argument:

Premise 1 - Everything that comes into being has a cause of its being.
Premise 2 - The universe came into being.
Conclusion - The universe has a cause of its being.

(For the structure of this argument I am indebted to William Lane Craig)

Of course the question then becomes, "what is a sufficient cause for the appearance of something like the universe?" When we consider everything that the universe contains, particularly in our small section of it, then one must look for a cause that makes sense. One would not say that the ingredients of the cake are the cause of the cake. Simply finding the composite parts of the universe does nothing to explain why they are composed in the precise ways that they are. Descartes principle is perhaps helpful here. He said that in our experience causes are greater than their effects. We do not see order caused by disorder or intelligence by non-intelligence. Thus the sufficient cause of the universe must be something greater than the universe. God certainly fits that description and thus cause and effect leads us back to an absolute beginning of cause and effect.

One critic, Gordon Stein, suggested that this same argument could be applied to God. If everything must have a cause, then God of course must have a cause. But again, that is not exactly what Christians are saying. We are saying that "everything that comes into being" must have a cause. And God did not come into being. If he did, then of course we need to start looking at the conditions prior to God for an explanation of His existence. But surely, as Aristotle has noted, there can be no "infinite regress of causes" here. Surely there is something that is stable and original, whether that be matter or God. The question posed by the Cosmological argument is simple. Which is a better candidate for an absolute causal origin to the universe, matter or God?

2. The Kalam Cosmological Argument:

Premise 1 - Adding one event to another can never result in an infinite number of events in time.
Premise 2 - The universe is just such a collection of events.
Premise 3 - The universe is not actually infinite, but had a beginning.

Imagine for a moment a ladder. Each rung of the ladder represents a specific temporal event, like the moment that just passed. Now imagine that there are an infinite number of rungs on the ladder going downward. If the present moment is a specific rung on the ladder, how could that rung be reached if one needed to pass an infinite number of rungs before one could touch it? Such is the dilemma presented by the Kalam scholars of the middle ages.

If there is an infinite collection of events going into the past, how did the present moment ever come into being? Zeno's paradoxes relate somewhat to the various challenges to Kalam. For example, Geometry tells us that there are an infinite number of points between where I sit and the wall, thus I will never reach the wall, because to do so I must traverse the distance by half, and then that distance by half, and so on without end. But of course I know that I can walk to the wall. So is mathematics deceiving me about the nature of reality or is reality deceiving me about the nature of mathematics? Zeno believed that reality was deceiving me and that math was more nearly real. His conclusion was that reality was a kind of wholly stable mathematical entity, a kind of complex equation, and that there is no such thing as motion or change. Motion and change are illusory, based completely on our inadequate perceptions. The way to move beyond these deceptions is to practice mathematics.

The implications of this are rather interesting. For example, if you stare at the clock right now, there are an infinite number of points between where the second hand is now and the next number on the clock. Since it must traverse an infinite number of points, the next second can never arrive, correct?
Neurotransmitters travel between cells in the brain over a space, which also contains an infinite number of points, which means that thoughts can never be completed because they can never cross this microscopic yet infinite distance.

All of this seems to indicate, as the Kalam argument suggests, that there is a difference between potential infinites (a number of points on a graph in the abstract) and actual infinites (what it would mean if there really were an infinite number of points between point a and point b in our experience).
The Kalam argument suggests that there is a difference between math in the abstract and actual events in time. Math is merely analogous to our experiences, but is not identical (isn't that comforting). Thus the best explanation for an absolute origin of events in time is something outside of time, not subject to it, who is a sufficient explanation for the nature of motion and change. Surely something that is itself subject to change cannot be an explanation for change anymore than a moving universe can explain the movement of the universe.

Another way to say this is simply to note that time is not the same thing as the measurement of time. One is mathematical, the other reality. The measurement is merely analogous to the reality. In that sense, 5:30 is not really all that significant, at least not nearly as significant as the events that take place in that space of time labeled with the numbers 5:30. But the point is that before 5:30 was 5:28, and before that yesterday, and before that last year, and so on until the absolute beginning of time. God is the best accounting for an absolute beginning to the events we measure mathematically.

3. The Telelogical Argument:
Premise 1 - The fine tuning of the universe for the appearance of intelligent life is either due to necessity, chance or design.
Premise 2 - It is not due to necessity or chance.
Premise 3 - The universe was designed.

The core of this argument rests on premise 2. Why is it unacceptable to believe that the universe is necessary as it is or is due to chance?

On the necessity argument, two things can be mentioned. The first is a rather philosophical point and the second a more scientific one. First, we continue our enquiries into a question until we have a simple and satisfactory answer for a phenomenon. By simple we mean an answer that is a kind of indivisible, rock bottom answer, requiring no further parsing. For example, no one really asks why we are breathing animals. The answer we have for this is sufficient and requires no further probing. It just is that way! It is futile to spend one's life studying why there are laws of attraction or why 2 and 2 make 4. On such enquiries, simple, rock-bottom answers requiring no further explanation have been reached.
Now is that the case with the universe as we know it. Which is a simple explanation of the fine tuning of the universe? Matter or God? Matter is simply not sufficient as an explanation for order. One can think of many follow up questions to such a solution. Why does matter behave as it does? Why is it organized as it is? Why did it come alive on this planet? How did it come alive? Is there anything significant about it or is it in itself accidental to the structure of the universe, etc.

The second reason we can reject necessity as an explanation of the order in the universe relates to new discoveries in physics. This fits now under the heading, "Fine tuning." Essentially the argument here is that even the physical laws and constants of the universe are set for the appearance of material diversity like we find on the earth. From gravity to atomic forces to electromagnetism, all of the physical constants are set within an extremely narrow range for the appearance of a life-permitting planet like the earth. The point here is that the universe could have been different, could have possessed greater gravity, greater electromagnetic radiation, etc. So these values for gravity and atomic forces, etc. are not necessary. What, or who, created a universe with the primary conditions necessary for the emergence of stars, planets, light and heavy elements? The only other explanations available are chance or design.
Chance is an absurd explanation for fine tuning. Is it possible that a tornado passing through a junk yard can produce a 747 jumbo jet? Sure, it is remotely possible, but is anyone going to bet one's life on it? And, is it a better explanation than design?

Dr. Victor Stenger, an atheist physicist, has accused Christians of merely "arbitrarily excluding" low probability as an explanation for the emergence of an ordered universe. He points out that there are many low probability events that occur in the world, such as the birth of any one child. How many thousands of sperm are involved? And how many millions and even billions were involved if one considers all of one's ancestors as well? And no one reaches for "divine guidance" to explain the fortuitous birth of a particular baby from these billions of options.

Or consider the lottery. Here is a game with extremely low probabilities of winning. And yet somebody always wins. Is it a miracle? Divine design? No, says Stenger.

Now these objections are rationally absurd for any adolescent trained in rudimentary logic. His first argument commits the fallacy, "affirming the consequent." Consider the argument as a syllogism:
Premise 1 - If evolution occurred, then the improbable is possible.
Premise 2 - The improbable is possible (cite an example or two).
Conclusion - Therefore, evolution occurred.

One can see readily that the argument offends by affirming the second part of the conditional statement, and this of course proves nothing about the antecedent (first part of the conditional statement). Just because one can prove that some improbable events occur does not mean that the particular improbable event in view also occurred. If I tell you that some person was struck by lightening (an improbable event) and then go on to tell you that an alien culture will invade the earth in 20 years, killing all humanity, will you believe me? Remember, I just cited an improbable event, so you should believe me when I tell you that another improbable event is going to occur. Silly, right?

Another significant point can be mentioned: Is the birth of a child really a low probability event? Perhaps the joining of a particular egg and sperm is a low probability event, but that event operates within the framework of an extremely high probability event--namely, that when a man and women join in intercourse at the appropriate time, the likelihood of a sperm and an egg joining is significant.
The same can be said of the lottery. Perhaps it is a low probability that a particular participant in the lottery game will win it, but it is highly probable, even certain, that someone will win it, because that is how the game was "set up." One would not conclude that just because a low probability event takes place within the game that the game itself is an artifact of chance. Even Aristotle noted that chance explains some things, but not everything. More will be said on this when we get to the science and Christianity unit.

4. The Ontological Argument:

Anselm's version reads thus:
Premise 1 - Even a fool can conceive of a perfect being. (This Anselm based on our common experience. We all have the idea of a perfect being in our minds.)
Premise 2 - Things that exist in reality are greater than things that exist in the imagination alone. (Think Santa Clause... wouldn't he be even greater if he existed?)
Premise 3 - The perfect being must exist in reality, otherwise we could think of something greater.
Conclusion - The perfect being exists in reality and we call Him God.

Now this version of the ontological argument was, in the estimation of most philosophers, fairly well dismantled by Immanuel Kant. Kant noted that "existence cannot be predicated of a subject." When considering the subject/predicate relationship, we don't consider "existence" to be a property. While it may be true that an imaginary island would come with a certain set of predicates (properties, adjectives, descriptions), existence itself is not something that comes with the idea of any island, real or imagined. And if you added "existent" to an imaginary island, it would do nothing to add to its greatness.
Perhaps this is the best way to say this: "existence" does not add to the perfection of something--it merely identifies whether or not there is such a perfect thing in that class of things. It is a separate judgment from the quality of the thing under question.

An illustration of this point: I cannot meaningfully say that so and so is intelligent, beautiful, kind and "exists."

Or say it this way: Descartes and Anselm said, "If it's perfect, it must exist." Kant says, "If it exists, then it exists; and if it doesn't, then it doesn't... but this says nothing about its perfection." Thus, whether or not God exists is a separate question, for Kant, from those properties would make Him a great being, real or imagined. But simply acting as though "existence" is a property of His perfection does not "define Him into being."

Now this criticism may seem devastating, but there are efforts alive today among Christian philosophers to resurrect the ontological argument. Perhaps the best attempt comes from the Christian philosopher Alvin Plantinga. Here is his attempt:

Premise 1 - It is possible that there is a maximally great being.
Premise 2 - A maximally great being would exist in every possible world (that is, His existence would be necessary).
Premise 3 - One of the possible worlds is Alpha (the actual world).
Conclusion - God exits in Alpha.

Surely most people can agree that it is at least possible that a maximally great being exists. But if a person acknowledges this premise, the argument pulls him in, because it would surely count against the greatness of a "maximally great being" if He could not exist in all logically possible worlds. But among the logically possible worlds will be the actual one, so God must exist in it.

To be clear, Plantinga's ambitions are realistic here. He does not believe that this argument proves God's existence, but he does believe that it makes belief in the existence of God reasonable. There is surely nothing to keep a person from denying premise 1, but there is also nothing to prevent someone from affirming it. It does seem reasonable after all, and the logic of the argument from there is sound.

5. The Moral Argument:

Premise 1 - If there is no God, then there is no objective morality.
Premise 2 - There is objective morality.
Conclusion - There is a God.

Again, I am indebted to William Lane Craig for the logical structure of this age old argument. Here is an eminently clear statement of the Christian argument from objective morality. Much more will be said on this particular argument in the next lecture as we examine C.S. Lewis' concise summation of the moral argument in book one of Mere Christianity.

Bad Arguments:

6. Appeal to the Bible:

The Bible says that God exists and the Bible is God's Word, so God must exist. One can readily see that this argument commits the fallacy "begging the question." It assumes the thing it is trying to prove. One has a lot of work to do before one can say anything about the link between God's existence and the Bible. Perhaps it would be best to demonstrate that theism is reasonable first, and then to ask which of the theistic religions provides the necessary evidence of divine revelation. Once we do this, I think it is clearly true that Christianity offers compelling bibliography (textual evidence).

7. Appeal to Miracles:

This commits the same fallacy as the appeal to the Bible. Here are the most common atheistic objections and a few responses to those objections:

"Miracles are unusual occurrences. Shouldn't there be more evidence of them." But of course this is non-sense, because they are, by definition, unusual occurrences, meaning that not everyone is going to see one. If they did, then they would be "normal" or "usual" occurrences, and then the atheist is merely going to question the origin of the "normal," just as he does in cases such as DNA or other forms of design in nature. And so we reach stalemate.

"Miracles violate nature." It is seen by many atheists as self-contradictory that we claim that God is the source of natural law and then he "violates" natural law by doing miracles. But surely this isn't obvious. If the world God creates includes the possibility of bending nature for His purposes initially, then it is not a violation. What the naturalist is saying is merely this: "In a purely material world, any intrusion of the supernatural would be impossible." But only he believes that the world is purely material. If the world contains God, spirits, souls and the like, then nature is rather unpredictably interacting with forces outside of her. And thus when unusual events happen, the naturalist says, "ah, nature is mysterious and splendid." And the supernaturalist says, "ah, providence is mysterious and splendid." And we reach stalemate again.

"You have burden of proof." This is just an uninteresting objection. Whether we are talking about something that is an unusual natural event or a super-natural event, either requires some evidence. So the naturalist, with his claim that life came from non-living chemicals, or the supernaturalist, with his claim to miracles, both have burden of proof, and both have faith that their theories will be vindicated. And so we reach stalemate again.

"Do a miracle and I'll believe." If we produce a miracle, it is conceivable that our skeptical friends will simply claim that it is merely an "unusual natural occurrence." Certainly there are many unrepeatable natural occurrences in the history of the world, so the skeptic has an easy out. And we reach stalemate again.

Perhaps for the true observers of miracles stalemate is obliterated by a shining undeniable event. But then again, it occurs to me that if a skeptic is committed to his skepticism, he would touch the wounds in Jesus hands and then accuse him of being an illusionist. Stalemate!

All I'm pointing to is the reality that even if we supply the event, it must still be interpreted, and the interpretation will be according to an underlying worldview. If that worldview simply cannot allow for the possibility of miracles, then it becomes a kind of "unassailable naturalism" as Geisler puts it.

9. Appeal to Pascal's Wager:

Blaise Pascal suggested that if we bet on God and turn out to be wrong, then we have lost nothing. If we bet on atheism and it turns out there is a God, then we have lost eternity.

But again it is simply not obvious that Pascal is right on this. If we bet on God and turn out to be wrong, it is still the case that we lose much. If the Christian dedicates his life to Jesus, but God does not exist, and thus Jesus was deluded, then the Christian has wasted his life. The stakes are high indeed!
It is still true that if the atheist bets there is no God, and there turns out to be a God, he has lost a great deal, but Pascal's wager says nothing about whether such a God really exists or doesn't exist. It only highlights the fact that such a choice requires an assessment of the cost. Curiously though, it only calls attention to the cost to the atheist. The cost for being wrong in this is high to both the atheist and the Christian. Paul himself says in I Cor 15 that if there is no resurrection, Christians are to be "pitied" and they are "still in their sins."